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THE CLEAN WATER ACT: CITIZEN SUITS NO
LONGER A VALID ENFORCEMENT TOOL
FOR PAST VIOLATIONS
Private citizen suits seeking civil penalties for a corporation or gov-
ernment entity's past violations of the Clean Water Act (the Act) are
essential to achieve the Act's central purpose of restoring and main-
taining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters.' Toward this end, the Act allows both government2 and citi-
zen 3 suits. Courts have established that the federal government may
sue for past violations of the Act.4 Most federal district courts also
I. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 101(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1982).
2. Section 309(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
Civil Actions.
The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate re-
lief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he
is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this section.
3. Section 505 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
Citizen Suits.
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an efflu-
ent standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Adminis-
trator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged failure of the Administra-
tor to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with
the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limi-
tation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty,
as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
309(d) of this Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375-76 (10th Cir.
1979) (EPA may seek civil penalties for past violations or issue a compliance order to
prevent future violations); United States v. Detrex Chemical Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp.
735, 738 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (same); Student Public Interest Research Group v. Mon-
santo Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1476-77 (D.N.J. 1985) (government is not restricted to
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consistently allow private citizens5 to sue for past violations, even
though the polluter may be in compliance with the Act at the time of
suit.6 Federal appellate courts, however, have addressed this issue in a
limited and inconsistent manner.7 In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa-
abatement actions, which are only one "possible avenue"); Student Public Interest Re-
search Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (D.N.J. 1985) (EPA
may bring suit based on past violations).
5. Section 505(g) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g), provides: "For the purpose of
this section the term 'citizen' means a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected." See also 118 CONG. Rc. 33,699-700 (1972). The congres-
sional conference based this definition of citizen on the Supreme Court's holding in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), that the party seeking review must be
"among those injured by the action or inaction." 118 CONG. RPc. at 699-700.
Noneconomic injury to the environment qualified as injury under this test. Id. The
alleged injured interest "may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well
as economic values." Id. Cf Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 (1980); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 103-04 (2d
Cir. 1984); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 209
(D. Conn. 1985); Sierra Club v. Simkins, 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1128-29 (D. Md. 1985);
Student Public Interest Group of N.J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419,
1422-25 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. AT&T Bell
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (D.N.J. 1985); Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
6. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1550
(E.D. Va. 1985) (district court allowed citizen suits seeking civil penalties for past viola-
tions of the Act, regardless of whether the violator complied at the time of the suit);
Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 213-14 (D. Conn.
1985) (court allowed citizens to obtain civil penalty relief for past violations, but denied
recovery forprivate damages); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120,
1125-1126, 1127, 1131 (D. Md. 1985) (citizens, as private attorneys general, may seek
civil penalties for past violations, and penalties recovered are paid into the U.S. Treas-
ury); Student Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615
F. Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (D.N.J. 1985) (violation of the permit constitutes violation of
the Act; the Clean Water Act allows citizen suits for both past and prospective relief
because the "nature and extent of past violations are good indicators of a defendant's
future behavior"); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-41
(M.D. Pa. 1985). In Fishel, the defendant manufacturing plant was held liable to a
neighboring landowner for plant's past violations, even though plant no longer violated
the Act. The court held that its power to impose civil penalties in citizen suits had "no
limiting time frame." See infra notes 31-33 and 38-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Bell
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985). But see Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v.
Ciba Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986) (citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act pertain only to violations which are likely to continue and do not reach past
violations).
7. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., No. 85-3753 (5th Cir. May 29, 1987), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 501, 98 L. Ed. 2d (1987) (reaffirming the Hamker court's
holding); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (allowing citizen
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peake Bay Foundation (Gwaltney)8 the United States Supreme Court
resolved a three-way split among the federal courts of appeal and disal-
lowed private citizen suits for past violations of the Clean Water Act.9
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the National Resources De-
fense Council (N.R.D.C.) filed a citizen suit pursuant to section 505 of
the Clean Water Act.10 The complaint alleged that Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Inc., (Gwaltney) repeatedly violated the pollutant effluent
limits 1 of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit 2 by discharging wastewater into a nearby river. 3
suit based on past violation of Clean Water Act); Harnker v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring a violation occurring at the time
the citizen suit is fied); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d
1089 (Ist Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 484, 98 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1987)
(precluding a citizen suit based on past violations, but allowing a suit where there is a
pattern of intermittent violations or a likelihood that the defendant will continue to
violate the Act).
8. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
9. Id at 384-85.
10. Id. at 380-81. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and N.R.D.C. filed suit after send-
ing notice to Gwaltney, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Virginia
State Water Control Board indicating their intention to file a citizen suit. See infra note
47 listing the notice requirement. See supra note 3 containing the citizen suit provision.
11. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1987) provides: "Effluent Limitation means any restriction
imposed by the Director on quantities, discharge rates, and concentration of 'pollutants'
from 'point sources' into 'waters of the United States,' the waters of the 'continuous
zone,' or the ocean."
12. Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), provides in perti-
nent part:
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(a)(1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Adminis-
trator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 131 l(a), upon
condition that such discharge will meet either all applicable requirements under
sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318 and 1343 of this title, or prior to the taking
of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such condi-
tions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such permits to assure
compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including
conditions on data and information collection, reporting, and such other require-
ments as he deems appropriate.
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System is "the national program for
issuing, modifying, revoking and reissuing, terminating, monitoring and enforcing per-
mits, and imposing and enforcing pretreatment requirements, under sections 307, 402,
318, and 405 of the CWA." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1986).
13. Gwaltney, situated on the Pagan River near Smithfield, Virginia, processed and
19881
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Gwaltney contended that it was in compliance with the permit when
the citizens filed suit and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.14 The company argued that a defendant must be violating
the Act at the time the plaintiff files suit because the Act does not per-
mit citizen suits for past violations." The District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia disagreed,16 holding that the Act allows citizen
suits even if the defendant is not violating the Act at the time of suit.
The court in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
denied Gwaltney's motion to dismiss 7 and awarded civil penalties 8
packed pork products. Gwaltney's effluent discharges violated both daily and monthly
averages set by the NPDES permit issued by the EPA. Chesapeake Bay Foundation v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1986). The violations con-
sisted of twenty-two average monthly violations and thirteen average daily violations.
Id. The violations involved the pollutants fecal coliform, chlorine, and total Kjeldahl
nitrogen (TKN). Gwaltney violated its fecal coliform limitations 31 times, its chlorine
limitation 34 times, and its TKN limitation 87 times. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. at 376, 379 (1987). Discharges of the pollutant chlorine
ended in October 1982, and the EPA last recorded discharges of the pollutant Kjeldahl
nitrogen in May, 1984, approximately one month before the citizens filed the suit. Id.
Gwaltney reported the violations, as required by law, pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1318(a)(3)(A) (1982), 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(4) (1986). 791 F.2d at 307.
14. 108 S. Ct. at 380.
15. Id.
16. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va.
1985).
17. The court viewed the dispute as one of statutory construction. The words "to
be in violation," 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1972), could reasonably be read to encompass
unlawful conduct occurring prior to the filing of the lawsuit, as well as unlawful con-
duct continuing into the present. 611 F. Supp. at 1547. Alternatively, the district court
stated that Chesapeake Bay and the N.R.D.C. satisfied the subject matter jurisdiction
requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) because the complaint alleged in good faith
that Gwaltney's permit violations were continuing at the time the suit was filed. 611 F.
Supp. at 1549 n.8.
The court's review of the legislative history revealed no discussion of a requirement
that citizens sue only for current violations of the Act. Id. at 1548 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1972)), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 820 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REp. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1497.
The district court also relied upon Senator Muskie's statements that a citizen has a
right to file suit against any person who "is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation"
whether the violation is continuous or sporadic. 611 F. Supp. at 1548 (citing 118 CONG.
REc. 33,700 (1972)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 179. The court found
that these statements, while not controlling, supported a plausible reading of the statute.
611 F. Supp. at 1548.
Finally, the court found that citizen suits would lose most of their deterrent effect if
plaintiffs were unable to obtain civil penalties for past violations. Polluters would lack
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pursuant to section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act.1 9 Gwaltney ap-
pealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in Chesapeake Bay Foundation
v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,' ° holding that private citizens can seek
civil penalties for past violations21 of the Act.
an incentive to comply with the permit discharge limitations until a citizen actually filed
suit. Id. at 1549.
18. Id. at 1542. In assessing penalties, the circuit court affirmed the district court's
method of calculating the amount of the penalty. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1986). The EPA calculates a "monthly
average" as a violation for each day of that month, allowing a maximum penalty of
$10,000 per each day of the month rather than a maximum penalty of $10,000 for the
entire month. The court may reduce the penalty if appropriate. In addition, the court
penalized Gwaltney for daily violations occurring in months other than those in which
the company exceeded the monthly average. The court interpreted the language of
§ 1319 ("per day of such violation") to mean that the EPA should not assess the
$10,000 maximum "per violation," but "per day of violation." Id. at 313-15. Other
cases interpret 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) similarly. See United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580
F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("A 'violation' necessarily encompasses all the
days involved in the time period covered by the limitation."); United States v. Detrex
Chemical Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 737-38 (N.D. Ohio 1975). In Detrex Chemi-
cal, the court noted that 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982) "provides a maximum of $10,000
per day civil money penalty for violations of the Act." Congress intended $10,000 to be
the maximum daily penalty regardless of how many different violations occur in one
day. Id.
19. Section 309(d) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982), provides:
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of
this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a
State or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State, and any
person who violates any order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) of
this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such
violation.
Section 309(c) of the CWA generally provides for criminal penalties of between $2,500
and $25,000 per day for willful or negligent violations of the Act.
20. 791 F.2d 304, 316-17 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, -U.S. -, 108 S.
Ct. 376 (1987).
21. Courts allowing citizen suits for past violations of the Clean Water Act gener-
ally apply the five year federal statute of limitations provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2462
(1982) rather than any analogous state statute of limitations. This is contrary to the
usual practice that federal courts apply analogous state statutes of limitations when a
federal statute, such as the CWA, lacks a limitations period. Courts apply the federal
statute of limitations to citizen suits under the Clean Water Act because applying the
state limitation would "frustrate a federal policy underlying the cause of action under
consideration." Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Md.
1985). Under the Act, citizens file suit as private attorneys general, and the defendant
pays penalties to the United States, thus "[a]ny benefit from the lawsuit... inures to the
public or to the United States." Id (citing Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 449-50 (D. Md. 1985)). Cf. Connecticut Fund for the Env't v.
1988]
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The primary purpose of the Clean Water Act is to ensure the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of America's waters.22 In passing
the Act, Congress intended to eliminate the discharge of water pollu-
tants by 1985.23 The Clean Water Act was a novel approach to water
pollution problems.24 In contrast to the previous policy of post-dis-
charge water quality regulation, the Act established a new system of
permits which regulated discharge limits before pollutants entered the
navigable waters.25 Each permit set a specific quantity and quality of
allowable discharge.26 Congress designed the new system to fully regu-
Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 211-13 (D. Conn. 1985); Friends of the Earth v.
Facet Enterprises, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Student Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190,
1202-03 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D.N.J. 1985).
22. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). In Fairview Township, County of York,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 773 F.2d
517 (3d Cir. 1985), the court noted that Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 as a "comprehensive revision of the nation's clean
water laws, which had proven inadequate in the fight against water pollution." Id. at
519. Previous legislation included the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)
of 1948 and the Refuse Act of 1899. In 1977, the Clean Water Act amended the
FWPCA. Id. at 519 n.2. See also United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
372 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting congressional intent to eliminate pollutant discharge by
1985).
24. The Act departed from the previous policy of abatement through water quality
regulation, in which the EPA measured water quality after the discharge of pollutants.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 assigned enforcement of water pollu-
tion control to state governors. Federal assistance came only in the support of water
pollution research, new technology, and limited loans to finance treatment plants. Since
this program was unsuccessful, Congress made legislative changes in 1956, authorizing
federal grants for states to develop pollution control plans and build treatment plants.
States' needs, however, far exceeded federal government funding.
Finally, in 1965 Congress approved major legislative changes requiring the states to
establish water quality standards, subject to approval by the federal government. States
determined the type and amount of pollutants allowed into the state's waters, the degree
of abatement required, and the time granted to abate the pollution. The federal govern-
ment established a new federal agency, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Ad-
ministration, to administer the federal part of the program.
This program was not as successful as contemplated because many states failed to set
water quality standards. Standards were often dificult to set because of the differing
effects of various pollutants on different types of bodies of water. Moreover, the state-
established standards were often unenforced. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1971, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1-4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3668-71.
25. See supra note 24.
26. In 1970, the federal government instituted a new program for the control of
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late sources emitting pollution into the water.27
In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.2 s the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a citizen suit must fail
for lack of jurisdiction where the complaint did not allege a current
violation of an effluent limitation, standard, or order.2 9 The Hamker
court strictly construed section 505 of the Act,3 ° stating that the lan-
guage "in violation" means a defendant must be in violation of an efflu-
ent standard at the time of suit.3" Hamker relied on language from
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 2 stating that section
1365 lacks an explicit provision for suits against parties who previously
violated an effluent standard or limitation.33 The Hamker concurrence
narrowed the majority's holding by emphasizing that the case involved
only a single permit violation.34 The concurrence asserted that the "in
violation" language of section 505 is broad enough to include the re-
peat violator or a violator who knowingly halts the discharge when a
water pollution by regulating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. This
program emphasized pollution control at the source of the discharge, before pollutants
were released, rather than control based on the quality of water after pollutants were
released into the environment. Congress envisioned this new system of permits setting
effluent discharge limitations as a more direct approach to eliminate water pollution.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1971, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8
(1971). See also § 101 of the Act, supra note 1; 50 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COM-
MERCE 761, 761-66 (1985) (general discussion of the Clean Water Act of 1972); Student
Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419,
1430 (D.N.J. 1985) (Clean Water Act's permit discharge system improves water quality
by regulating effluent levels); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373
(10th Cir. 1979) (permits regulate quality and quantity of discharge).
27. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
28. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 398-99. The court further stated that continuing effects of the pollutant
discharges constituted an insufficient allegation of a current violation of effluent limita-
tions. Id
30. See supra note 3.
31. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 394-95. The Hamker court additionally asserted that it
was unnecessary to consult the legislative history of a statute when its language was
clear. Id.
32. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (holding that
the Act did not authorize a private cause of action for damages, and its legislative his-
tory failed to provide for class actions or actions for damages).
33. Id at 1014. The Hamker court also noted that Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth, v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) cited Evansville with
approval.
34. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 399.
1988]
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citizen files suit.35
Several district courts, however, allowed citizen suits for past viola-
tions, tacitly ignoring the Hamker decision.36 In Student Public Inter-
est Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,3 7 the New
Jersey district court construed the words "in violation" to mean that a
defendant is and continues to be "in violation" when it violates a
NPDES permit because "the taint" of a past violation continues.38
The Monsanto court disagreed with the Hamker court's analysis of Ev-
ansville and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association,39 stating that these cases dealt primarily with
private damage actions instead of citizen suits.4"
The Monsanto court noted that the references in the Act's legislative
history to "abatement" of violations could imply that the "appropri-
ate" remedies referred to in section 30941 contemplate only prospective
(injunctive) remedies.42 The court, however, discredited this theory,
stating that because the government is not limited to abatement ac-
tions, neither should citizens. 3 The court found that abatement is sim-
ply one alternative means of relief.' Both citizens and the government
35. Id At least one other court also narrowly construed the Hamker holding. See
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985).
36. See infra notes 38, 49, and 57-62 and accompanying text.
37. 600 F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J. 1985).
38. Id at 1476. A citizen may bring an action for an appropriate remedy against
any person who "is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation, whether the violation be
a continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one." 118 CONG. REc. 33693, 33700
(1972). Should the EPA fail to issue an abatement order when a polluter violates the
Act, a citizen may sue the Administrator. Id.
39. 453 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1981) (although the Act does not imply that citizens have a
right to recover private damages, they may act as private attorneys general to enforce
the Act or to seek civil penalties payable to the government).
40. Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1477. The Monsanto court found that Hamker relied
on equivocal language from both Middlesex and Evansville to support its opinion. Mid-
dlesex authorized only prospective relief. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 14. The Monsanto
court, however, noted that Middlesex referred particularly to a suit for private damages
and allowed penalties in citizen suits. Id. The Evansville court, in the context of a suit
for private damages, did not authorize suits for past violations. Monsanto found that
the Evansville holding only addressed the issue of private damage suits. Monsanto, 600
F. Supp. at 1477.
41. See supra notes 2 and 3.
42. Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1476. S. RFP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3746-47.
43. Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1476.
44. Id.
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have equal authority to seek remedies, including civil penalties for past
violations.45
The District Court of New Jersey in Student Public Interest Re-
search Group of New Jersey v. A T& T Bell Laboratories" considered the
importance of citizen suits. The court discussed the Act's requirement
that prospective plaintiffs give 60 days notice to both the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and the violator before bringing suit.47
The AT&T court, in contrast to the Hamker court, found that Con-
gress did not intend this requirement to allow a violator the opportu-
nity to comply with the permit and avoid the penalty.4" Hamker
would allow the violator to comply with the NPDES permit prior to
suit, avoid a penalty, and later resume noncompliance, making the citi-
zen suit ineffective.49
Recognizing that the EPA plays an important role in enforcing the
45. Id. at 1476-77. See also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.(1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3746 ("[Ihe standards for which enforce-
ment would be sought either under administrative enforcement or through citizen en-
forcement are the same."). See supra note 38.
46. 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985).
47. Id. at 1194. Section 505b(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982), provides:
(b) Notice.
No action may be commenced-
(I) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged viola-
tion (i) to the Administrator [of the EPA], (ii) to the State in which the alleged
violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or
order....
48. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1196. The court also noted that the Hamker court
found that Congress intended the 60 day notice to allow compliance with the permit,
precluding the citizen's right to sue. The AT&T court found that Hamker's conclusion
directly conflicted with Senator Muskie's statement that "[c]itizen suits can be brought
to enforce against both continuous and intermittent violations." 118 CONG. REC.
33693, 33700 (1972) (report of Conference Committee on S. 2770).
49. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1196. The court also discussed the 60 day notice re-
quirement and the ease with which violators can negotiate new permits. If the Act
required the permit to be "in effect," or if the violation had to be current at the time the
citizen filed suit, polluters could almost always escape liability by simply renegotiating
new permits after citizens filed suits. The court stated, "To the extent that the Act seeks
to deter violations, permitting a defendant to avoid liability for past violations works a
substantial diminution of any deterrent effect." Id. at 1196 (citing Sierra Club v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 585 F. Supp. 842, 853-54 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)). But see Hamker,
756 F.2d at 398 (court rejected this contention, saying that the Administration's "non-
discretionary duty to promulgate adequate regulations" under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(b)(1)(B) (1982) was not a consideration).
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Clean Water Act,5" the AT&T court noted that the 60 day notice pro-
vision gives the EPA an opportunity to sue, thus precluding a citizen
suit."1 Despite these limitations, the court in AT&T held that citizens
still retain enforcement and remedial authority under the Act.52 The
court noted that government entities themselves may be polluters.
53
Therefore, the court must protect a citizen's right to bring a suit to
compel the EPA and state governments to enforce the Act's standards,
thereby achieving a nationally uniform enforcement policy.54 More-
50. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1196-97.
51. Id. at 1197. Section 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982), provides:
(b) Notice.
No action may be commenced...
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a
court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
But see 118 CONG. REc. 33,700 (1972) (Congress did not intend the notice provision to
preclude a citizen's cause of action as to "violations that took place 60 days earlier but
which may not have been continuous").
52. The court stated, "The scope of enforcement and the remedies available are
[not] sharply reduced for citizens." AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1197. Cf. Gwaltney, 791
F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The scope of citizen enforcement powers must.., be
viewed as co-extensive with the enforcement powers of the EPA."); see also supra notes
35, 42-44 and accompanying text. Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co.,
623 F. Supp. 207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985) (remedies obtainable in citizen suits should be
co-extensive with those available in suits initiated by the federal government); Student
Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419,
1425 (D.N.J. 1985). The'court in Georgia-Pacific noted that "[c]itizens have access to
the same remedies available to the EPA." Since the EPA can sue for past violations,
citizens are not limited to prospective relief. Id.
53. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1197. See Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking
Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 23, 23-28 (1985).
54. See AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1197-98. Congress assumed that state agencies
would be largely responsible for enforcement. Id. at 1198. The states acting individu-
ally, however, would not enforce a nationally uniform policy. Id. States competing for
industry may avoid their enforcement responsibilities to attract business. Id. Only
strong citizen suits will prevent this avoidance of responsibility. Id. at 1198-99. Thus,
citizen suits "confined to prospective relief for ongoing violations could not fill this
role." Id at 1198. See also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3668, 3746 ("[C]itizens should be uncon-
strained to bring these actions, and.., the courts should not hesitate to consider them.
Since some Federal agencies.., have failed in abating pollution.., it is important to
provide that citizens can seek, through the courts, to expedite the government perform-
ance .. "); see also Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, S. REP.
No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3668, 3678. Fadil notes that implementation of the Act depends "upon the pres-
sures and persistence which an interested public can exert upon the governmental pro-
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over, the AT&T court asserted that citizens, like the EPA,55 must be
able to seek both civil penalties and prospective remedies against future
violations.5 6
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.57 was
the first federal court of appeals case to allow civil penalties for past
violations of the Act. The Fourth Circuit thus directly opposed the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Hamker5 s and followed many district court
holdings. Chesapeake II stated that the "in violation" language of sec-
tion 505 of the Act is ambiguous.59 Consequently, statutory structure
and legislative history are important factors for determining the "scope
of citizen suit jurisdiction."'  The court noted that many enforcement
sections of the Clean Water Act refer to both government and citizen
remedies in the present tense.6 1 The "in violation" language, referring
to government power, includes previous as well as ongoing violations.
62
The court emphasized that any other reading of the statute would elim-
inate the Act's deterrent effect.63 In order to effectuate their deterrent
value,64 the court viewed citizen suit enforcement powers as "coexten-
cess. The [EPA] should actively seek, encourage and assist involvement and
participation of the public.., in implementation and enforcement." Fadil, supra note
53, at 23-28.
55. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1197. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 13, 14 n.25 (1981) (EPA can "respond to
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits"; citizen suits can seek
injunctive relief or the court can award civil penalties); United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 376 (10th Cir. 1979) (EPA can sue for civil penalties of past viola-
tions); Student Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985) (citizens have the same relief as the government, includ-
ing suits for past violations).
56. AT&T, 617 F. Supp. at 1198.
57. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986).
58. Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
59. 791 F.2d at 309.
60. Id
61. Id. The court examined the use of present-tense enforcement language in 33
U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(1), (a)(3) and 309(cXl).
62. 791 F.2d at 309.
63. Id at 309-10 (noting that "[a]ny other reading ... would.., severely undercut
the Act's ambitious purpose, 'to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the nation's waters' "); cf AT&T, supra notes 46-49 and accompany-
ing text.
64. 791 F.2d at 310.
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sive with the enforcement powers of the EPA."65
The court also referred to Senator Muskie's comments in the Act's
legislative history regarding the interpretation of the "in violation" lan-
guage.66 Senator Muskie asserted that citizens may seek a remedy
against any continuous or sporadic violator of the Act.67 The court
concluded that the Act's legislative history favored allowing citizen
suits for past violations.68
The Fourth Circuit also ruled that section 505(a) of the Clean Water
Act specifically authorizes courts to award "any appropriate civil pen-
alties under [section 309(d)] ... of the Act in citizen suits."69 The
court believed that section 505(a) authorizes courts to use their discre-
tion in applying civil penalties to past violations.70 The court also
found that the Act limits citizen suits and reasoned that courts should
avoid adding restrictions beyond those enumerated by Congress.71 The
restrictions imposed by the Act include the 60 day notice period in
section 505(b)72 and the fact that the EPA Administrator or the state
may preclude a citizen suit by diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal
action.73 The Act also precludes citizens from seeking criminal
65. Id.
66. Id at 311 n.13. Senator Muskie played a crucial role in drafting and sponsoring
the CWA. The court thus gives his remarks greater weight than that normally afforded
to legislators. Senator Muskie specifically stated that a citizen may initiate a suit against
anyone "who is alleged to be or to have been in violation, whether the violation be a
continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one." Id.
67. Id at 312. See supra note 34. See also 118 CONG. REc. 33,700 (1972), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 17, at 179.
68. 791 F.2d at 311.
69. Id. at 310. Cf Georgia-Pacific, 615 F. Supp. at 1425 (courts have held § 505(a)
and § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), to sustain civil penalties for past violations in citi-
zen's suits.) The court in Student Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985), however, cited United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 376 (10th Cir. 1979), although the Earth Sciences court
referred only to the government's authority to sue. See also Student Public Interest
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985)
(section 505(a) "quite specifically refers to the court's power to impose civil penalties in
citizen's suits and contains no limiting time frame").
70. 791 F.2d at 310.
71. Id Citizen enforcement authority is narrower than the government's. The Act
imposes express limitations on the ability to bring citizen suits, and only those limits
expressly provided by Congress shall be imposed on citizen suits. The court refused to
impose additional limitations by implication. Id.
72. Id. See supra notes 38 and 47 and accompanying text.
73. Id. See supra notes 49 and 51 and accompanying text.
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penalties.7 4
The court disregarded the defendant's argument that allowing citi-
zen suits for past violations of the Act would inundate the federal
courts.7 5 This argument fails to support restricting the scope of citizen
suits because the authority of district courts to hear state law claims is
discretionary.76 Thus, district courts need not adjudicate all claims.77
The First Circuit in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba Geigy,
Corp."8 adopted a moderate approach, holding that citizens may not
sue for a single previous violation of a permit effluent limitation. The
court, however, would allow a citizen suit if there was a "continuing
likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, [would] proceed to vio-
late the Act."79 The Pawtuxet court warned against strictly interpret-
ing the statutory language to require violations to occur on the actual
date a complaint is filed.80 The First Circuit stated that courts should
consider several factors to determine whether a violation is likely to
continue. These factors include: the isolated or recurrent nature of the
violation, the defendant's intent, and assurances against future
violations."1
The Pawtuxet court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the citi-
zen suit seeking civil penalties.8 2 The district court had dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction. Significantly, however, the facts before
the Pawtuxet court made it clear that there was no future possibility of
a permit violation. The defendant had ceased to operate under the per-
mit system of the Clean Water Act.
8 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney attempts to settle a three-
way split among the circuits, but it fails to set forth any concrete guide-
74. Id. (citizens cannot seek criminal penalties or issue compliance orders under the
Act, but the Act does not deprive citizens from suing post violation).
75. Id. at 312-13.
76. IdL
77. Id
78. 807 F.2d 1089 (Ist Cir. 1986).
79. Id at 1094.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 807 F.2d at 1091.
83. 807 F.2d at 1091-92. Defendant was situated on a river and had allegedly ex-
ceeded its discharge limitations under the NPDES. Id Pawtuxet Cove Marina was
situated down river from the defendant. Before Pawtuxet Cove Marina filed its com-
plaint, the defendant completed a tie-in with a municipal treatment facility and was no
longer operating under the permit.
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lines. The Supreme Court holding most closely resembles the Pawtuxet
decision. The Court held that although section 505 of the Clean Water
Act does not permit citizens to sue for wholly past violations, it gives
courts subject matter jurisdiction when citizens make a "good faith al-
legation of continuous or intermittent violation[s]. ' 84 The Court re-
manded the case to determine whether Gwaltney continued to violate
its NPDES permit. 85 The Court, however, failed to delineate guide-
lines regarding what constitutes a "continuous or intermittent viola-
tion" or a "good faith allegation" of such a violation. The Court also
failed to set guidelines as to when during the legal process the viola-
tions must occur.
The Gwaltney Court engaged in a four-step analysis. First, the
Court noted that the language "to be in violation"86 requires an allega-
tion of intermittent or continuous violation or "a reasonable likelihood
that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future." 7 The Court
referred to citizen suit provisions in other environmental statutes
which allow only prospective relief.88 The Court noted further that
Congress knew how to avoid implying prospective relief.8 9
The Court refuted the contention that citizens should be allowed to
sue for past violations since the EPA Administrator can do so, and
since the citizen suit sections of the Act contain parallel language.
90
The Gwaltney Court recognized that sections 309(a) and (b) do not
address the Administrator's ability to seek civil penalties. Civil penal-
ties are addressed in section 309(d), which lacks the "in violation" lan-
84. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 385 (1987).
85. Id
86. See supra note 3 (citizen suit provision).
87. 108 S. Ct. at 381.
88. Id See, eg., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1977); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).
89. For example, in the Solid Waste Disposal Act Congress explicitly used language
allowing for wholly past violations. 108 S. Ct. at 381 and n.2. See Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III). In 1984 Congress amended the
Act to permit citizen suits for "past or present" violations of the Act. Prior to this
amendment, the Solid Waste Disposal Act contained language identical to the "alleged
to be in violation" language of § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act. The Court also noted
that recent Clean Water Act amendments permit certain administrative penalties
against any person who "has violated" the Act. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-4, § 314, 101 Stat. 46.
90. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 381-82
(1987).
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guage.9 1 The Court relied on its decision in Tull v. United States,92
holding that 309(d) establishes an enforcement power separate from
section 309(a) or (b). 93 Section 309(b) provides for enjoining current
violations and section 309(d) provides for civil penalties.94
Section 505, however, does not contain separate sections granting
civil penalties and injunctive relief. Because section 505(a) contains
both civil penalty and injunctive provisions in the same subsection, the
Court interpreted it to mean that civil penalties are associated with
injunctive relief when citizens seek to enforce the Act. Thus, a citizen
civil penalty suit is meant to enjoin only an ongoing violation.95 The
Court also interpreted the consistent use of the present tense through-
out section 503 to mean that Congress intended citizen suits for pro-
spective relief only.96
Second, the Supreme Court noted that allowing citizens to sue for
past violations would nullify the requirement9 7 that a citizen provide
60 days notice of intent to sue the state, the EPA Administrator, and
the alleged violator.9 EPA or state enforcement action within 60 days
of receiving notice bars a citizen suit.99 State or EPA action makes the
citizen suit unnecessary."oc The 60 day notice gives the alleged violator
an opportunity to comply with the Act and would be superfluous if
citizens could sue for past violations.1"1 The Court interpreted the ban
on citizen suits in the face of governmental enforcement action to mean
that the citizen suit supplements rather than supplants governmental
91. Id. at 382. See supra note 19.
92. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
93. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. Id. Section 505(f) provides that citizen suits may be brought only for violation
of a permit "which is in effect." Section 505(b)(1)(A) states that citizens must give
notice to EPA, alleged violator and the State in which the violation "occurs." Section
505(h) allows the Governor of the State to sue as a citizen for a "violation... which is
occurring in another State and is causing an adverse effect on the public health or wel-
fare in [the] State." Section 505(g) defines "citizen" as "a person... having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected."
97. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. 382-83.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1XA).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(bXl)(B).
100. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
101. Id at 383.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:413
action.' 02
Third, the Gwaltney Court examined the legislative history to sup-
port its holding."°3 Congress often referred to citizen suits as injunc-
tive or abatement measures."° 4 Senate and House Reports drew a
parallel between section 505 citizen suit provisions and the Clean Air
Act citizen suit provisions, which are wholly injunctive. 0 5 Although
the Supreme Court considered Senator Muskie's statement that "a citi-
zen has a right under section 505 to bring an action for an appropriate
remedy in the case of any person who is alleged ... to have been in
violation," it nevertheless found support lacking for citizen suits for
past violations.'0 6 The Court noted that the Senator's statement 10 7 al-
lows citizen suits for intermittent or continuing violations.' 08
Fourth, the Supreme Court stated that the Clean Water Act requires
only proof that the defendant is "alleged to be in violation" of the Act
when the suit is fled.' 9 A good faith allegation of permit violations is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. "0 The Court suggested, however, that
even if the defendant violated the Act at the commencement of a suit, if
violations ceased during litigation, the citizen suit may be dismissed as
moot,"' if there is "no reasonable expectation" 2 that the wrong will
102. Id. The Court stated that the Administrator may choose to forego civil penal-
ties if the violator takes corrective measures. Id. If the citizen suit could seek civil
penalties for those past violations, it would frustrate the Administrator's actions. Id.
103. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383-84.
104. Id at 383.
105. Id See S. REP. No. 414, at 79 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISToRY,
supra note 17, at 1497 (citizen participation under the Clean WaterAct is "modeled on
the provision enacted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970"); H.R. REP. No. 911, at
133 (1972) (section 505 closely follows the concepts utilized in § 304 of the Clean Air
Act).
106. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 384. But see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (the Fourth Cir-
cuit recognized that Senator Muskie referred to "intermittent" or "sporadic" violations
as past violations, not continuous violations).
108. Id Senator Muskie's full statement allows a citizen suit "in the case of any
person who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation, whether the violation be a
continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one." Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id at 385 (emphasis in original).
110. Id at 385. The Court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 11 requiring pleadings "to be
based on a good-faith belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, that they are 'well-
grounded in fact.'"
111. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
112. Id. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
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be repeated."' 13
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, concurred
in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Scalia believed that the
Court's requirement of only a good faith allegation that the defendant
is "in violation" at the time the suit is filed inappropriately created a
new form of subject matter jurisdiction.'4 He interpreted the Court's
standard to allow an unproven allegation of a violation to carry the
lawsuit to judgment. 15 Justice Scalia stated that the Court replaced
the requirement of proof with a good faith belief. 16 He would require
the violator to be "in fact in violation" upon commencement of the
suit. The violator would have to put remedial measures in place to
avoid being "in violation" of the Act on the date suit is filed.7
Justice Scalia mitigated the strictness of his jurisdictional standard,
stating that subject matter jurisdiction may not be defeated once the
suit is filed simply because the defendant attempts to remedy the viola-
tion. Rather, the cure for a past violation must be clear.'18 Justice
Scalia admitted that his standard would probably result in the same
outcome that the Court reached in this case." 9
Although the Supreme Court's analysis in Gwaltney is technically
logical, it fails to recognize citizen suits as valid enforcement tools.
The opinion ignores the concerns addressed in AT&T and Chesapeake
Bay that the 60 day notice provision was not solely intended to allow
the violator to comply with the permit requirement. 2 ° Otherwise, the
violator could comply with the NPDES permit prior to commence-
ment of the suit, and later resume noncompliance, destroying the deter-
rent effect of the citizen suit provision.2 The notice provision merely
allows the state or the EPA to take enforcement action and preclude a
113. The Court stated that the defendant must show that it is "absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." 108 S. Ct.
at 386 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
114. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 387.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. "Subject matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things at the time of the
action brought; ... subsequent events cannot 'oust' the court of jurisdiction." Id at
387, (citing Mullen v. Torrance, 23 U.S. (9 Wheat) 537, 539 (1824)).
119. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 388.
120. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 47-49 and 63 and accompanying text.
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citizen suit. 122
The Court also ignores section 505(b)(1)(B), which precludes a citi-
zen suit only if the Administrator or the state is diligently prosecuting
a civil or criminal action.123 A citizen suit should not circumvent the
Administrator's decision to forego civil penalties if the violator abates
the violation. This diligent prosecution by the EPA would preclude
citizen action.
This, however, does not address the case in which the EPA or state
fails to diligently prosecute subsequent to the citizen plaintiff's 60 day
notice. Preventing citizen suits for past violations of the Act in this
instance seriously curtails the power and the deterrent effect of such
suits. If a citizen suit can only seek an injunction, the violator has no
incentive to cease discharging pollutants beyond those allowed under
the permit system. The violator faces no threat that a citizen suit may
impose for any past violations. The violator only faces an injunctive
slap on the wrist.
The Administrator may seek both injunctive relief and civil penalties
for wholly past violations.124 The citizen suit is permitted only when
the Administrator or state fails to diligently prosecute an action. 125
Thus, the citizen suit provision, section 505(b)(1)(B), is not limited to
injunctive relief. The Administrator must diligently prosecute past vio-
lations and seek prospective relief.126 Allowing citizen suits when the
Administrator fails to prosecute for past violations does not supplant
the Administrator's role. Rather, contrary to the Court's analysis, 127
the citizen suit would be an effective supplement if it is used to seek
civil penalties for past violations when the Administrator fails to dili-
gently prosecute.
The Court's theory that section 309 separates injunctive relief and
civil penalties is also somewhat strained.12 The Court interpreted sec-
tion 309(b) to provide for injunctive relief and section 309(d) to provide
for civil penalties.' 29 Section 309(b) allows "appropriate" relief, in-
122. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 51 and 73 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 51 and 73 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 51.
127. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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cluding injunctive relief. Contrary to the Court's interpretation,13 0 the
section does not clearly separate the enforcement powers of injunctive
relief and civil penalty.131 Incorrectly, the Court contrasted the sepa-
ration of civil penalties and injunctive relief in section 309 with the lack
of separation in section 505.132 The Court thus wrongly concluded
that the lack of separation in section 505 between injunctive relief and
civil penalties means that the citizen suit provision equates civil penal-
ties only with injunctive or prospective relief.133
The Court's interpretation of section 505, limiting citizen suits to
prospective relief, may encourage similar limitations on other environ-
mental statutes. The Gwaltney Court noted that other statutes contain-
ing the "to be in violation" language allow only prospective relief.134
The Court also suggested that if Congress intends to permit citizen
suits for past violations, it must amend the statutes. 135
The Court, however, failed to distinguish between the Clean Water
Act and other environmental statutes. Each statute with which the
Court compared the Clean Water Act lacks a civil penalties provision
in its citizen suit section. Therefore, although the Clean Water Act
contains the same "alleged to be in violation" language as other envi-
ronmental statutes, Congress intended civil penalties for citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act to provide different relief. The Court, how-
ever, failed to note this distinction.
The Court's jurisdictional analysis provides unclear guidance. The
Court interpreted the Act to require a "good faith allegation" that the
defendant is "in violation" 136 and relied on the federal rule requiring a
good faith belief that pleadings are grounded in fact. 137
The Court suggested three standards which would defeat the citizen
suit once it is fied. First, a defendant may succeed on a motion for
130. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
131. Section 309(d) simply sets the amount of civil penalty. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
134. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381; see also supra notes 88-89 and 105 and accompa-
nying text.
135. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381; see also supra note 89.
136. 108 S. Ct. at 385. See also supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
137. FED. R. CIv. P. 11. The rule requires a "good-faith belief found after reason-
able inquiry, that [the pleadings] are well-grounded in fact." Id. See also supra note
110 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment if the allegations were a "sham and raised no genu-
ine issue of material fact."1 ' Moreover, the suit may not be main-
tained even after litigation commences if "there is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated." '139 Finally, if it is "abso-
lutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to recur,"'" the citizen suit would fail. Even though the
defendant's burden in proving mootness is heavy, the Court's standard
would allow a defendant who violated the Clean Water Act's permit
requirements after suit was filed to cease the violations and take correc-
tive action resulting in dismissal of the case. Thus, the defendant lacks
incentive to cease violations prior to suit, leaving the citizen suit virtu-
ally ineffective.
By holding that penalties for past violations are not properly within
the scope of citizen suits and by narrowly interpreting "in viola-
tion,"'' the Gwaltney Court frustrates Congress' intent to use citizen
suits as a strong enforcement tool.'42 The Court's interpretation of the
Clean Water Act cripples the effectiveness of the citizen suit and fails
to fully realize the Act's central purpose of "restor[ing] and main-
tain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."'14 3 Stripping the citizen suit of the power to seek penalties for
past violations also inhibits Congress' desire to remedy inadequacies in
the pollution control program through a new system of effluent limita-
tion permits intended to regulate the sources of water pollution.'"
Even if the EPA is not diligently prosecuting an alleged violation,
the citizen suit is henceforth limited to injunctive relief. Violators not
pursued by the EPA face no threat of penalty for past wrongs. Even if
a citizen suit alleges a violation sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the de-
fendant can escape the citizen suit provision by demonstrating its cor-
rective measures. A violator is thus immune from any reprimand for
damage it has already imposed on the environment, seemingly without
regard to whether past violations caused irreparable damage.
Although citizen suits retain some viability in the attempt to clean up
138. 108 S. Ct. at 386.
139. Id. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
140. 108 S. Ct. at 386. See also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 49, 52-54, 63-65 and accompanying text.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1251a (1982).
144. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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our Nation's waters, the Gwaltney Court drastically limited a vital part
of the Act's enforcement scheme.
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